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THE CENTRALIZATION OF AFRICAN SOCIETIES

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## ABSTRACT

Many arguments have been advanced concerning the economic basis of state formation. This essay summarizes these arguments and tests them -- albeit in a highly unsatisfactory way -- with data drawn from the sample of African societies archived in the Human Relations Area Files.

Many of the arguments are "neo-contractarian"; they emphasize the role of the state in promoting economic efficiency. Others are loosely "neo-Marxist"; they emphasize the role of the state in securing the redistribution of income.

Both kinds of arguments find support in the data. The paper therefore concludes by examining the degree to which the element of economic redistribution represents a "reasonable price" for the provision of economic prosperity.

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## THE CENTRALIZATION OF AFRICAN SOCIETIES\*

It [is] a principal theme of this book that a man who wants to secure and maintain a following must be able to offer his followers some material advantage. [Mair, 1962, p. 160]

The analysis of the origins of order in decentralized societies is perhaps the most famous contribution of African studies to the study of politics. Yet recent scholarship has argued that too much emphasis has been placed upon decentralized systems. On the one hand, their occurrence appears to be relatively infrequent; on the other, even insofar as decentralized societies do exist, they can arguably be regarded as transitory -- as societies which once were centralized or which are in the early stages of a movement toward more centralized political forms (Horton, Jones, Stevenson).

This essay examines various hypotheses concerning the economic basis for political centralization. For among the most frequently posited motives for the formation of states is the desire to achieve economic objectives -- ones that presumably could not be achieved under decentralized political systems, such as those described by Evans-Pritchard.

By political centralization is meant the surrender of voluntarism as a basic principal of social action. Under a centralized system, individual members of society are no longer decisive; they cannot veto collective decisions and unanimity is not

required. Rather, socially binding actions are taken by a subset of society's member and individuals can be compelled to comply with decisions taken by these agents. As empirical marks of centralized systems, we can note the existence of a bureaucracy, an army, or a central political figure, such as a chief or monarch. The presence of such political attributes suggest a heightened capacity for coercion and the existence of political figures capable of making socially binding choices.

A key purpose of this chapter is to formulate, characterize and expound arguments concerning the economic basis for state formation. Many of these arguments have been left implicit in the literature; most are partial. An important objective of this essay is therefore to make the arguments explicit and fully to elaborate them. A second objective is to assess their credibility. Concerning this second task, a few comments are in order.

To evaluate the arguments concerning state formation, I employ the materials compiled in the Human Relations Area Files. These files consist of an annotated compendium of historic and ethnographic reports concerning a sample of thirty-six African societies.<sup>1</sup> The data are the richest available, but they are seriously flawed. The number of cases is small. The data were collected for one purpose and are being used for another; as a consequence, information is frequently missing. And, most galling, the principle of selection is unknown; there is no statement as to why one society is included and another is not, save for the fact that the one has attracted a greater

amount of scholarly investigation. The nature and magnitude of the bias in the sample set of cases therefore cannot be estimated.

In the face of such difficulties, I have decided that the appropriate stance is one of modesty. I have used the data but I have approached their analysis as a "five finger exercise" -- something that must be done but which can at best be small in scale and can never be decisive. I have therefore subjected the data to simple cross tabulations, employing controls where numbers permit. While, for purposes of interpretation, I do assess the significance of the associations evidenced in these cross-tabulations, it must be stressed that the sampling procedures employed render significance tests relatively meaningless. The quality of the data render them suggestive at best. Throughout this paper, I strive to respect that limitation.

A last preferatory comment is in order. Correlational analysis, rather than causal inference, is the highest level of data analysis to which this effort can aspire. One reason becomes obvious when the full range of hypotheses is examined: there are many possible economic "causes" of political centralization. And given the small number of observations, it is difficult to isolate the effects of single variables, as would be required for causal analysis. Secondly, and even more important: it is clear that in the case of most of the hypotheses, causal effects run in both directions. In the face of reciprocal causation, and given that we lack longitudinal data, we can observe at best correlations among the variables.

#### THE "RICARDIAN" MODEL

One of the basic arguments linking political centralization with economic reward rests upon the desire of people to benefit from the gains in welfare which can be reaped from markets. In essence, the argument is Ricardian. Rather than attempting to be self-sufficient, different portions of society, it is held, can do better by specializing in the production of those goods in which, by dint of their resource endowments, they hold a comparative advantage and by exchanging a portion of those goods for those made by persons with different resource endowments. In the context of this argument, the contribution of the state is to provide order and peace and thereby render production and exchange possible for members of society. the origins of the state, then, lie in the welfare gains that can be reaped through the promotion of markets.

This argument, of course, has been advanced in fields other than African history. Indeed, its most notable development has been in the history of Europe. Either in the guise of Pirenne's analysis, with its emphasis on exchange and trade and the role of government in protecting marketing centers, or in the guise of Marxian analysis, with its emphasis on production and the role of the state in securing the interests of dominant classes, the basic argument is repeatedly advanced: that the growth of the market leads to the emergence of centralized political forms.<sup>2</sup>

While thus echoing the works of other scholars, ethnographers and historians in Africa differ from them in important respects. They

give particular emphasis to the role of trade; indeed, some have gone so far as to posit a distinctive African state system -- one based on the extraction of the gains to be made from commerce (see Coqüery-Vidrovitch, Meillassoux). Moreover, they develop distinctive themes in their treatment of this basic thesis, in part simply because they deal with a distinctive subject matter. In particular, to a greater extent than their "European" counterparts, they contrast the efficiency of trade under decentralized political systems with that under more centralized systems, and seek thereby to demonstrate the superiority, and thus the desirability, of the latter.

Decentralized Systems: Perhaps the best analysis of the economic strengths and weaknesses of decentralized lineage systems is offered by Colson. Colson illustrates how trade was abetted by the lineage system of one decentralized group, the Tonga of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). Lineages were dispersed and "did not share a common residence" (p. 606). A person wishing to make exchanges "could travel safely for considerable distances, provided he exercised caution" by moving along "the chain of kinship" (ibid.). In trading relations, the lineage system fortified property rights and provided security for exchanges: "In the event that a claim was not met, the lineage had the obligation to take vengeance" (ibid.). The institution of the feud, characteristic of lineage-system societies, was used to provide security for those engaged in market exchanges:

Those who wished a further safeguard could initiate a "bond friendship" with prominent men along the route or at the place of

destination. The man who accepted such a pact agreed to guarantee a friend's person and property while he remained within the neighborhood. An attack upon either was considered an attack upon the host who could then summon kinsmen and supporters to retaliate against the offender. [Colson, 1962, p. 606]

Lewis finds a similar system was at work among the Somali; as he reports:

To reach the coast in safety a caravan had to have protection on its journey among many different and often hostile clans. This was achieved by an institutionalized form of safe-conduct. The leaders of the caravan . . . entered into a relationship of protection with those amongst whom he passed on his way to the coast. . . . Attacks on a protected caravan are attacks on the patron and his lineage whose honor and "name" . . . can only be upheld by prompt retaliatory action. [I. M. Lewis, 1962, pp. 369-370]

A system of lineage relations could thus be used to support trade. But it apparently failed to do so efficiently. Colson indicates, for example, that the Tonga never really reaped the gains associated with economic specialization; they failed to specialize either by region or by craft and instead continued to adhere to the "ideal of self-sufficiency" (1962, p. 607 ff). Moreover, the literature from other decentralized societies strongly suggests that even were the system of lineage relations able to generate significant

benefits, the costs of obtaining them in this manner appeared to be high. As noted in the last chapter, decentralized means of protecting economic rights rest in large part on the ability and readiness of persons to employ force. Each party must invest in means of protection. And, once provided, each must demonstrate his willingness and ability to inflict retribution. Order, in essence, is a by-product of the institutionalized feud. Decentralization is thus a costly system.

The Centralized Alternative: Indeed, the literature strongly suggests that more centralized systems are formed in order to avoid the turmoil of feuding. Ethnographers note that the societies now called the Alur actually imported chiefs from neighboring people in order to form a more centralized political community. They did so because, with the feud, they "did not have any formal means of bringing hostilities to an end" (Mair, 1962, p. 58); the centralized system of chieftaincies was useful, for it "introduced new techniques of peacemaking, arbitration, and conflict management" and provided a wider and more effective system of law and order (Southall, 1965, p. 80ff). Similar findings are reported for the Sukuma, the Anuak, the Tio, the kingdoms of Ruanda and Burundi, and for the societies of Southeastern Nigeria.<sup>3</sup>

Nigeria, indeed, provides some of the most interesting insights into the relationship between exchange, feuds, and the organization of coercion. Northrup, Dike, the Ottenbergs and others have, for example, analyzed the spread of the Aro, a group which

organized trade in Southeastern Nigeria and provided as well a system of internal justice and military protection. Quoting from interviews with Ibibio headmen, Northrup describes how villagers would meet to decide whether or not to call for the Aro to settle in their area:

At this meeting the advantages of a permanent Aro settlement (wealth, disposal of criminals and other undesirables, exotic goods and 'medicines,' access to the Oracle) would have been weighed against the disadvantages. (The words . . . meaning greedy and 'tricky' occur with astonishing frequency in conversations about the Aro.) [p. 127]


The Aro were themselves traders; they provided protection for trade; and they provided the "Oracle" -- a judicial system for resolving disputes without taking recourse to feuds. These advantages led to their rapid expansion, Northrup and others note, as local communities called them in (for a related study, see Ruel).

To secure the prosperity associated with trade, then, decentralized societies do contract for the services of more centralized systems. In addition, the evidence suggests that traders themselves preferred to transact with centralized groups. The basis for this preference is revealed in the accounts of early traders; as discussed by Goody, these accounts suggest that strangers

passing through the country were called upon to pay duty to divisional chiefs. This payment was a kind of protection money and, provided the charges were not exorbitant, traders usually

preferred to travel in relative security through such kingdoms rather than run the risk of being raided in the country of their chiefless neighbors. [1967, p. 184]

Testing the Argument: There is thus an arguable relationship between the existence of gains from trade and the formation of centralized coercive organizations, capable of enforcing property rights and securing exchange relations. This argument can best be summarized in the form of Diagram I.



In an effort to test the "Ricardian" arguments, I use a variety of indicators of centralization. I have also collected information on a variety of factors relating to ecological variation, trade, and conflict.

As has been stressed since the time of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, it is extraordinarily difficult to form a coherent typology of African political systems (see, for example, Lloyd, 1965 and 1968; Southall, 1956; Beattie, 1959; and the review article by Mair, 1975). In particular, the concept of centralization is sufficiently fuzzy to engender caution in all those who seek to array these systems along

that dimension. As a consequence, rather than try to generate any summary measure of centralization or to construct a unitary typology, I have chosen to employ a variety of measures of centralization and to examine the behavior of the societies with respect to each.

The first distinguishes among the following: societies governed by a decentralized system of kinship, those in which there is a central monarch, and those in which there are chiefs (but no monarch). Groups representative of the first category are the Tonga, Luo, Dorobo, Tio, and Nuer; examples of the second are the Mossi, Asante, Ganda, Bemba and Nupe; groups of the third kind are the Yao, Chagga, and Mende. The second indicator of centralization is the existence of a central bureaucracy. The third is the presence of any form of national army. The last is the existence of a national army which is recruited and commanded by a central military figure.

The "Ricardian" arguments suggest that the existence of potential gains from specialization and trade motivate the formation of a political framework capable of securing these gains. But causality can run in the other direction as well; indeed, as has already been seen in the accounts drawn from the ethnographies, a centralized political system itself attracts traders. In the face of such reciprocal causation, the best that can be hoped for are correlations between the various measures of political the variety of key factors cited in the "Ricardian" arguments.

The first such factor is ecological variation. I asked my coders<sup>4</sup> to indicate whether the society had an internally diverse

ecology, whether it abutted an ecological divide (e.g., lay in the savannah but adjoining the forest), or whether it lacked proximity to any significant form of ecological variation. As seen in Table 1, two of the four measures of centralization -- those having to do with political structure and the existence of a central bureaucracy -- correlated with the factor of ecological diversity; the existence of a national or centralized army did not.

The second element in the argument is, the existence of trade. I asked my coders to look for evidence of organized exchange: the presence of market centers or caravans or of long distance trade. As seen in Table 2, societies which possess organized market centers more frequently had monarchs and a central bureaucracy; those in which there were trading caravans more frequently had monarchs and a central bureaucracy and slightly more frequently possessed a national army as well; and those which engaged in long-distance trade far more frequently were ruled by chiefs and monarchs and more frequently possessed a centralized bureaucracy. Trade and political centralization thus appear to go together, although the correlation is more characteristic of "civilian" measures of centralization (the possession of chiefs and monarchs and a central bureaucracy) than it is of "military measures" (the possession of a national army or of any army under a central command).<sup>5</sup>

The last element in the argument is the level of conflict. In the context of this analysis, the most relevant of form of conflict is the feud. If centralization is adopted as a more efficient means of

securing the benefits of economic exchange, then measures of centralization should correlate inversely with the presence of feuds. As seen in Table 3, political centralization decisively impacts upon the level of feuding; societies with central monarchs and centralized bureaucracies far less frequently are subject to the costs of feuding.

Before undertaking further analysis, I wish to recall the parallels which these results bear to other historical materials. That long distance trade is related to the development of states; that there is an intimate link between the presence of organized market places and the rise of centralized political forces; that the termination of feuding and the preservation of peace and order correspond with the rise of monarchs -- these findings out of Africa resonate strongly with those from Western history, particularly from the medieval period. While the distinctive features of African culture and history must be stressed, what is striking at this juncture is the degree to which these findings underscore the generality of the African experience.

Augmenting the Ricardian Argument: The basic strategy of what is being termed the Ricardian argument is to relate institutional reform to gains in efficiency. Institutional reform -- such as the development of the capacity to maintain peace in the market -- makes higher levels of well-being possible -- in this case, by facilitating trade. As everyone could be better off under the new institution, the argument contends, there are strong incentives for people to organize it. One way or the other, it is contended, people will secure an



institution under which they all stand to gain.

Ironically, the basic problem with the argument is that it is insufficiently motivated. As the gains in efficiency from the innovation of new institutions are available to everyone, it is in no one's particular interest to provide them. In essence, the gains which the new institution provide constitute a public good. As all can enjoy these gains, each does better letting someone else supply them. To secure the provision of new institutions, then, the logic of free-riding must be overcome. In this section, we examine one way in which this may be accomplished: by conferring an over-riding private interest in the provision of new institutional arrangements. In particular, we determine whether a major portion of the gains from trade were privately appropriable so that persons would be motivated to lobby for the institutional reforms which would make them possible.<sup>6</sup>

One circumstance under which major private benefits would arise from establishing the political foundations for peaceful trade would be if there were but a small number of economic agents, each of whom dominated a significant proportion of the market. The benefits to each would then possibly outweigh the costs of providing those services which support the operations of the market. While we cannot test this argument directly, we nonetheless can test corollaries of it.

We would expect there to be, for example, a relatively small number of relatively large-scale economic agents where economic

activity is characterized by large investments. Particularly in societies where capital markets are poorly formed, large investments would involve the interests of only a few: those who for whatever reason were richly endowed. In Table 4 we see that societies in pre-colonial Africa in which there took place large investments of private capital, the political systems more frequently possessed central monarchs. To a very slight degree, they more frequently possessed centralized bureaucracies and national armies as well; they less frequently were characterized by centralized command over the military, however. Had these data been drawn from a random sample, it should be noted, then none of the relationships would be statistically significant.<sup>7</sup>

Further data is contained in Table 2. A major lesson contained in these data is that political centralization is related not just to trade but to long-distance trade (vide the data on caravans and on whether trade was with proximate or distant sources). The contention that long-distance trade is a basis for state formation has, of course, long been made by certain African scholars (Vansina 1962a, 1962b; Coquery-Vidrovitch). What is relevant here is that the pattern is what would be expected if efficiency gains must be privately appropriable in order to motivate the development of political institutions. This assertion rests on several grounds.

A key reason for the patterns in Table 2 may well be that the capital requirements imposed by long-distance trade meant that only a few could participate in it. By comparison with local trade, long-

distance trade involved goods of high value; only such goods could withstand the transport costs. For security purposes, the goods had to be bulked and large numbers of carriers and defenders hired on. Moreover, a wages fund had to be created in order to maintain the enterprise over the period of travel. As Roberts states:

A large ivory caravan -- and for self-defense it might number several hundred (some ran into thousands) -- could not carry food for a long journey such as that between Tabora and the Coast (which usually took ten weeks). Instead, it carried goods with which to buy food. Furthermore, all caravans had to pay tolls at various points along a trade route and had to be supplied with an acceptable medium of payment. [1970, p. 52]

The initial outlays were thus large by comparison with local trade of cheaper goods, which, perforce, were marketed over shorter distances. Lastly, by comparison with local trade, the returns from long-distance trade were long postponed. As noted by Vansina, seasonality in the production of the goods involved often necessitated the protracted holding of expensive inventories (1973, pp. 8, 258). Moreover, large amounts of capital were tied up in goods in transit; the "turn around time" of long-distance transactions often involved many months.

The higher value of the items exchanged; the greater investment in transport, security, and a wages fund; and the larger amounts of capital tied up in inventories -- these requirements insured that, by contrast with local marketing, only the wealthy could

engage in long-distance trade. As Dickson notes for West Africa:

Trading was the prerogative of royalty, nobles and rich men. The reason for this may have been mainly economic . . . for trading at distant places in those times of general insecurity required . . . a heavy outlay as only wealthy persons could afford. . . . The poorer sections of the population were . . . effectively excluded from large-scale long-distance trade although there was no law expressly forbidding their participation in it. [p. 106]

The relative concentration of benefits would help to explain why private interest would more readily translate into demands for public services in support of this industry, and therefore why long-distance trade tends to relate to political centralization.<sup>8</sup>

Capital requirements thus constitute one factor leading to the concentration of benefits from trade. Another is the apparently inherent expansionary behavior of the markets themselves. Markets tend to exhibit increasing returns to scale. In part, the returns to scale derive from the fixed costs associated with entering a market: the cost of setting up business, unloading, and exhibiting wares, for example. They also arise from other forms of fixed costs -- such as the provision of police protection, shelters for traders, protected warehouses, etc. They result as well from the decline in search costs for consummating exchanges as the number of traders increases; buyers and sellers can be more certain of making a transaction the larger the

number of agents engaged in trade. For all these reasons, all else being equal, it may be cheaper to transact in larger markets.

There are thus incentives for markets to expand. Other factors remaining equal, the number of markets would then decline. The consequence is that the incentives to lobby by trade groups strengthens, for the benefits associated with trading tend to be concentrated. Another consequence is that the occasions for political intervention become more frequent; market centers would tend to engage in oligopolistic rivalry as expansion leads to concentration and competition. The demand for state intervention, either to advance the interests of a particular market or to restrict rivalries between them, thus increase.

The expansion in the size of markets, their decline in number, the resultant pattern of competition and conflict between trading centers, and the mobilization of political power in support of trading interests -- these patterns, which are derivable from the economics of market places, are widely recognized themes in the historical literature on Africa. Bonner, for example, notes the rise to prominence of Delagoa Bay as a trading center and the resultant conflicts in Southern Africa to which this gave rise. As he states, "the volume of trade handled by Delagoa Bay expanded substantially from the middle of the eighteenth century, and this promoted an escalation of conflict throughout the hinterland" (p. 7). While the chief beneficiaries of the growth of trade in Delagoa Bay were the Tembe, Bonner concludes, "there are grounds for believing that each of

[the other local] kingdoms owed their early development to . . . competition for trade" (ibid.). Stevenson, writing of Dahomey, notes that

In the latter half of the nineteenth century there . . . emerged [a] major contest for . . . domination in the trading zone, which in the Dahomey instance led to the reduction of the number of competing units. [p. 220]

Northrup too attributes increasing political concentration among the trading states of coastal Nigeria in part to the growth and expansion of business conducted by individual trading centers. Consolidation was further abetted, he notes, by "the natural desire of European captains to be able to gather an entire cargo from a single port rather than taking on partial cargoes at each of several smaller ports" (p. 87) and to the competition among the trading states to which this gave rise. "As the trade . . . expanded," he concludes, "the coastal communities underwent gradual but decisive territorial growth [and] political centralization" (pp. 86-87). The wars and rivalries associated with the desire to secure the dominance of particular trade centers or trading routes are too frequently noted and too familiar to require further documentation here.

These arguments thus allow us better to comprehend the relation between the existence of market centers and the development of centralized political structures demonstrated in Table 2. They also lead us to expect further relationships in the data. They lead

us to expect, for example, that the greater the movement toward political centralization, the greater the tendency for societies to protect trade routes and marketing centers. While the lack of information in the data sources renders the number of cases excessively small, the data do tend to support this contention: only central monarchs provided protection to markets and trade routes, they suggest, and those societies with national bureaucracies and armies tended to provide it more frequently than did others. Moreover, contributors to the literature suggest that centralized states can secure the triumph of particular markets or promote peace among competing ones. We should therefore expect political centralization to be associated with fewer instances of market rivalry. Again, missing information bedevils the data; but what few data there are (eight to twelve observations) suggest that market rivalries are more frequently found in societies which lack chiefs or monarchs, a centralized bureaucracy, or a national army.

There is, of course, a last reason for private interest to be linked to the political promotion of trade: the fact that the rulers can secure their incomes from the taxation of commerce. In an important recent essay, Robin Law argues that while West African societies were based on agriculture, West African polities derived the bulk of their incomes not from agriculture but rather from trade (Law 1978). This position has also been argued, though in less detail, by Coquery-Vidrovitch. Should rulers derive the bulk of their revenues from trade, then they would, of course, have strong incentives to

employ their political power to promote it. Linked by the factor of taxation, states and markets should therefore grow together.

The data only partially support this argument. I asked my coders to indicate for each society all the "significant" sources of public revenue. The most frequently mentioned sources of revenue were agricultural: the ruler's own estates or gardens, his own cattle, or tribute, much of which was made up of agricultural products. Forced labor and confiscation were the next most frequently mentioned. Then came trade, with market fees representing the least frequently employed source of public revenues.

With centralization, trade did in fact become a more frequently noted source of state income. I found that as centralization increases market fees and trade were more frequently cited as a significant source of public revenues. As societies adopted centralized bureaucracies, they also increasingly drew on market fees and trade for taxes. With centralization, states tax other things as well, however; as centralization increased other sources of state income were more frequently mentioned in the data files, none of these sources deriving from markets or trade. The increasing use of trade and markets as a source of public revenue may thus reflect not any systematic preference for the taxation of trade but simply the increasing ability of more centralized polities to levy taxes.

While the data thus suggest that agriculture remains a significant source of public revenues, they do in one respect support

the thrust of Law's analysis: that with centralization goes an increased use of trade as a source of public income. This is sufficient to suggest a self-interested basis for providing political support for commerce. The growth of the market and the rise of states may go together simply because of the increase in public revenues which the market can provide and the incentives which are thus supplied for public officials to protect and promote commerce.

The fiscal link between trade and state formation arises in another fashion. Insofar as states derive their monies from taxes on markets, then it is politically undesirable to have proximate markets which are under separate jurisdictions. For when such markets exist, traders can switch to the market which is less heavily taxed; and the states, in search of revenue-yielding commerce, have incentives to lower taxes. Under such circumstances, then, the states acquire fewer funds. They can attempt to negotiate a common tariff policy; but given the advantages which accrue to the state with lower tariffs, such agreements tend to be unstable. Or they can consolidate their jurisdictions either through negotiation or conquest and then impose a single -- and presumably higher -- level of taxes. Mechanisms of taxation can thus link the existence of markets to the expansion of states. These dynamics apparently underlay much of the "port politics" of West Africa. Akinjogbin, for example, stresses their importance in accounting for the rise of Dahomey. And scholars of later periods stress their significance in accounting for the tendency of the colonial flags to follow colonial commerce in the period of

imperialist expansion in West Africa (see, for example, Kimble).

Production: Thus far I have tended to concentrate on the market portion of the Ricardian argument. Significant arguments also arise with respect to the relationship between production and political organization. To these we now turn.

Marxist analysis emphasizes, of course, the centrality of the role of production in determining political relations. Moreover, in explaining the rise of the state, it gives primary emphasis to the role of capital. One need not be a Marxist, however, to argue that capital formation and political centralization go together. Major investments, for example, entail high present costs; the returns often accrue only after the passage of time. The acquisition of skills, moreover, represents a human investment -- one that also pays off only after the passage of time. Prior to investing in physical goods or human skills, therefore, people must be certain of their future returns. On these grounds alone we should therefore expect to find greater levels of investment in more highly organized political systems -- ones which offer greater prospects of peace and order -- than in systems which lack central agencies of coercion. Those making such investments would promote centralization, in other words, in order to secure stability.

The argument echoes that advanced by some historians of American industrialization. Kolko, for example, argues that a reason for the abandonment of decentralized markets and the development of central regulatory agencies by the United States government in the

Progressive Era was that investors sought profits from new capital-intensive technologies -- those centering on the steel and rail industries -- and that their decisions required a stable and favorable planning horizon, one that could be established by the mandating of set charges and prices. A similar argument is advanced by scholars of developing societies. Guillermo O'Donnell, for example, relates the growth of bureaucratic power in Latin American countries to the need by investors for a stable economic environment prior to their commitment to the formation of fixed capital for heavy domestic industries.

With respect to the African data, we have already noted the relationships portrayed in Table 4. I also collected data on the degree to which people held large inventories. This I used as a measure -- albeit a very awkward one -- of investment. And I collected data as well on the extent to which the societies contained craft specialists. As seen in Table 5, both measures strongly associate with the civilian indices of centralization. It should be noted that they do so even when controlling for the importance of trade; the relation is thus not merely a corollary of our previous findings.<sup>9</sup>

There is additional evidence for the relation between the need for economic stability and the rise of centralized states. Historical studies suggest that those whose interests were tied to production and trade sometimes took a distinctive position in debates over public policy. In particular, they appear on occasion to have formed a

pressure group opposing the pursuit of war. Thus Wilks notes the formation of a "political party" in Ashanti which stood for "peace, trade and open roads" and opposed the continuation of warfare by the Ashanti military elite as it threatened these objectives (1975, pp. 684ff). A similar lobby existed in Oyo; its activities apparently played an important role in the split between the Alafin and the Oyo Mesi that so characterized the politics of that kingdom (see Atanda, Awe, Morton-Williams, and Law). Conflicts between commercial interests and an aristocracy which lived off warfare also constituted a major political divide among the Wolof of Senegal and helped to promote the rise of Islamic sectarian movements in that and other savannah societies in pre-colonial West Africa (see, for example, Cruise O'Brien).

Economic interests thus appear to have favored peaceful, stable and predictable relations -- ones that would allow them better to reap the rewards of their outlays. Insofar as politically centralized states could provide a more stable economic environment, then these interests allied with the forces of centralization. But insofar as centralized agencies -- such as military forces -- threatened their prosperity, then these interests withdrew their support from that element of the centralized society. While a central army may provide protection for investments and trade, it can also be employed in political adventures -- something that threatens the interests of those who need the certainty of an uninterrupted flow of positive returns before they can enrich themselves by investing.

This argument, which is largely derived from narrative sources, helps to explain a strongly anomalous pattern in the data: the relatively weak performance of military as opposed to civilian indices of centralization. This contrast in the behavior of the civilian and military measures of centralization has hitherto been disconcerting. But, upon reflection, it is what would be expected, were inter-temporal stability a major objective of the political strategies of major economic interests.

#### DEMOGRAPHY, LAND, AND CROWDING: PROPERTY RIGHTS ARGUMENTS

The essence of the Ricardian model is that state power facilitates the attainment of economic gains and that it does so by securing property rights over returns from productive investments or from transactions in the market place. There is a second strand in the literature which also stresses property rights; but it looks less at trade and production than at people and natural resources.

The argument begins by noting the relationship between soil quality and state formation. When societies were located in areas of soils of uniform quality, then, the literature suggests, states did not form. When they were located in particularly fertile soils, then, however, states may have formed. Colson, for example, notes the disparity in soil qualities in East and Central Africa and comments:

The soils elsewhere in Sub-Saharan favoured shifting cultivation with . . . a dispersal of population. Exceptions were found in

the intra-lacustrian region bordering on Lake Victoria with its rich volcanic soils . . . and in the flood plains of the Upper Zambezi, where soil fertility was renewed by the annual flood. [1969, p. 41]

It was in the intralacustrian area and Zambezi valley, Colson notes, that centralized states were formed.

In one of the major essays on the politics of pre-colonial Africa societies, Gluckman (1965) examines the dynamics of state formation. Gluckman explains the failure of states to form throughout much of Southern Africa in terms of the relatively uniform productivity of the land and in terms of its abundance. Thus, he argues, when "rising numbers place . . . a steadily increasing pressure on the resources of [a] tribe's territory [then] sections of the tribe . . . moved away to [other] lands and to independence" (1960, p. 161). It was only when good lands became relatively scarce, he claims, that the process of state formation began, and in particular, that the region witnessed the rise of the Zulu nation. Gluckman's argument concerning the Zulu -- who engaged in one of the most rapid and explosive instances of political organization in recorded history -- has received strong support from more recent scholars, such as Bonner and Omer-Cooper.

The literature thus suggests that we should expect greater degrees of political centralization in areas of comparatively fertile soils. The data in Table 6 lend modest support to this conjecture.

In linking the quality of natural resources to state

formation, scholars tend to invoke a second major factor: population density. Particularly favorable natural endowments tend to attract greater numbers of people. And as the density of population increases, it is held, the occasions multiply in which the behavior of one person influences the productive activity of another. This is particularly true with respect to land usage. The greater the number of claimants for land and the greater its relative scarcity, then the greater the extent to which one person's use of this resource precludes another's. There is thus an incentive to render land a well-defined commodity: one that is amenable to compensation for its utilization. And the agency that enforces the rights which define commodities is, of course, the state. This argument is central to Engles' interpretation of the rise of "primitive" states; ironically, it is also central to the new institutional economics as developed by such neo-classical economists as Dempsetz, North, Thomas, and Davis.

The critical role of population density in political change has been most thoroughly investigated in non-African settings. Carneiro, for example, has developed the concept "environmental circumspection," which refers to the property of distinctive locational advantage which, he argues, induces a high density of population with an attendant rise of land scarcity, conflict, and the formation of political systems. And students of medieval history, such as Postan and Ladurie, have related changes in population to changes in the extent and depth of the market, to changes in the distribution of income (via alterations in relative factor prices),

and to changes in the institutional framework of agrarian societies, including their political relations (see also Brenner).

While lacking the centrality achieved in other fields, such demographic hypotheses have been vigorously debated in the African literature as well. Stevenson and Vengroff, for example, have argued the general proposition that high population densities were associated with the formation of states. The case has been most carefully and persuasively advanced in particular case studies, however; so too has the contention that resource scarcity and the need for mechanisms of conflict resolution provide the major intervening variables.

In his study of the Tio, for example, Vansina notes that initially "land was without value and anyone could always leave and build his own home where it pleased him" (1973, p. 82). As a consequence, "the losers could leave the game when they wanted to . . . People would split up long before they reached the level of actually fighting with one another" (ibid). But, he notes, with denser populations, "the situation was different. There existed a limitation in favorable sites . . . and the struggles may have been more intense, with . . . strife and warfare occurring much more frequently" (ibid, pp. 82-83). A major response of the Tio, he indicates, was the provision of political officials to adjudicate disputes and to mediate conflicts over scarce resources. A similar evolution is suggested by Roberts in his discussion of the Nyamwezi. "Until the later nineteenth century," Roberts argues, "there was little pressure for chiefs to exercise authority over large numbers of



people. There was no serious competition of the land-use, such as might call for regulation by superior authority" (1970, p. 42). With the growth of population, however, the situation apparently changed, and there was a movement toward the creation of more powerful chieftaincies (see also Hopkins, p. 38).

I attempted to test the demographic argument. Direct tests were difficult, however, for estimates of population and area were often lacking and, when they did appear, they fluctuated widely between different sources. There was no remedy for the first problem; to cope with the second, I simply abandoned any confidence in "point estimates" and instead computed both highest and lowest estimates of population density. As seen in Table 7, there was sometimes a strong relationship between the estimates of population density and the measures of political centralization. The higher the population density, the greater the level of political centralization.<sup>10</sup>

The arguments thus far suggest that favorable resource endowments attract large populations and that population density promotes the formation of political systems by generating a demand for the vesting of property rights over scarce resources. Another possibility is, of course, that population density promotes political centralization not by creating a need for property rights over resources but by promoting the growth of markets and trade. The question naturally arises: are not our previous findings, summarized in the Ricardian argument, then spurious? Do we not simply have a variant of Ladurie's "great demographic cycle", wherein economic and

political change covary as a consequence of their shared relationship to population growth? The answer to this question lies in the use of statistical controls. While the small number of observations available very severely frustrated attempts to control for the effects of population density, in a few cases, enough observations were available to introduce such controls. Although the small number of cases severely devalues the significance of the relationships, we may nonetheless note that, as illustrated in Table 8, economic and political factors tend to be related, even after controlling for the density of population. The data thus suggest that the relationship between economic activity and political centralization is not merely a consequence of the operation of more fundamental demographic factors.

#### RENT SEEKING

The desire for economic prosperity can be linked to the employment of coercion in a variety of other ways. One is through the factor of rents. Rents represent an economic value over and above what could be obtained in competitive markets. They can be created purposefully; monopoly rents, for example, accrue to those who restrict competition in product markets. Or they can be created by nature. Special sites confer particular advantages upon people fortunate enough to be located on them; being inherently scarce and non-mobile, these sites favor a fortunate few and competitive forces cannot erode their locational advantage. Rents accrue to those who occupy particularly fertile soils, a favorable geographic location, or

an area with mineral deposits, for example. Material advantages are conferred upon those who control such resources and they generate incentives for others to attempt to seize them. The existence of rents thus gives rise to tensions and conflict and motivates the organization and employment of force for economic purposes.

Exemplifying these dynamics is Birmingham's discussion of the salt and copper mines of Central Africa. Control over the mines, Birmingham asserts, made possible the levying of revenues; those who "controlled the area allowed some neighboring peoples in to work the mines on payment of a fee, but others . . . were excluded from the area" (p. 167). Moreover, it made necessary the organization of defense. For in response to the existence of these rents, he indicates, "the Portuguese tried to move inland and gain control of the mines". And in response to the Portuguese incursions, "resistance forces of a far greater magnitude were mobilized" (p. 166). The existence of rents in the form of mineral deposits thus increased the demand for the organization of force and the ability to mobilize resources by which to supply it (see also Fagan; Wilks; Hopkins, pp. 47ff; and Sutherland-Harris).

Earlier figures show the relationship between land quality and centralization (Table 6) and between trade and centralization (Table 2). The data in Table 9 show the relationship between the possession of mines and the level of political organization. In nearly all of the sixteen tests of the argument possible with the data, the relationships run in the right direction. The presence of mineral

deposits tends to associate with political centralization.

#### THE STATE AS MEANS OF PRODUCTION

States not only assist in the performance of markets; they are also directly productive. For this reason as well, those seeking economic gain may seek the formation of states.

States, for example, produce public goods. We have already analyzed their role in producing security and property rights. They also produce infrastructure. This apparently was as true in pre-colonial Africa as it is elsewhere. For, as seen in Table 10, the data generally support the contention that political centralization correlated with the supply of public goods -- roads, bridges, canals and pontoons being the ones recorded.

The states of pre-colonial Africa were productive in another sense. For it appears that in some instances they operated as economic agencies: ones that secured inputs, organized them into productive enterprises, and generated a final product for exchange with other economic actors, thereby generating profits.

In some areas, the state simply traded on its own account. Thus the Asante government maintained from time to time a state trading corporation, the Batafo, which marketed kola, gold, and slaves in both the northern territories and the coast. But the states usually lacked a relative advantage in such activities, and found that they could more efficiently generate needed revenues by leaving the conduct of trade to private entrepreneurs and by taxing them.<sup>11</sup>

The states did hold a relative advantage in some kinds of economic affairs, however: ones in which organized violence could be utilized as in a profitable activity. One such area was in the securing of slaves. Labor was a relatively scarce factor; compared to other factors, the marginal return to labor was high. With abundant and freely obtainable land, able bodied people could in many cases insure themselves of a prosperous subsistence livelihood; the opportunity costs of labor were therefore high and labor was costly in the marketplace. There were thus strong incentives to use coercion to secure workers at below the market price. By forcibly extracting workers from the relatively prosperous subsistence sector and by compelling them to work at reduced levels of remuneration, those with control over the means of coercion could appropriate much of the returns to this scarce factor (for further discussion, see Fage).

Sometimes slaves were used domestically in plantations, gold mines, or the public service. In other cases, they were sold abroad. In either instance, warfare was used to generate economic advantage. As Vansina writes: "The real reason . . . that Angola needed war [was] because they bred slaves" (1968, p. 150). And as Roberts reports for the Bemba: "In the old days, at least, they took a positive pride in 'cultivating with the spear'" (1973, p. 182). The close connection between state power and the slaving industry is underscored by the rise of such societies as the notorious Yeke -- ones whose state systems specialized in the production of slaves.

Conventional historiography sees the slave trade as leading to

a major decline in the political and economic systems of Africa. More recent work questions this assessment (see, for example, Fage, Curtin, Law and Northrup). While those societies which were conquered and enslaved clearly were weakened by the slave trade, there are few signs that those who initiated the capture of slaves "disintegrated" either politically or economically. Rather, using the export of slaves and the import of guns as indications of participation in the slave trade, our analysis suggests that the tendency to reevaluate the disintegrative effects of the slave trade may be correct. For, as seen in Table 11, it was never the case that societies which participated in the slave trade more frequently tended to exhibit the traits of political decentralization; and it was often the case that they more frequently were politically centralized. Moreover, as seen in Table 12, measures of participation in the slave trade correlate with measures of economic prosperity: the presence of craft specialists and trade, for example. Furthermore, as seen in Table 13, while the importation of guns associates with the tendency toward internal feuding, the exportation of slaves does not, save in a negative fashion (neither relation would be statistically significant, however). The slave trade was clearly harmful -- indeed, disastrous -- to some societies; but it thus appears not to have been politically or economically harmful to others. Rather it appears to have played a role in their economic prosperity; and rather than weakening their internal unity, it appears instead to have promoted the forces of political centralization.

It will be recalled that in earlier sections we noted evidence of conflict between economic and military interests. Measures of military centralization sometimes failed to correlate with measures of economic activity; and historical accounts revealed tension between military and trading interests in the traditional kingdoms of Africa. Our present analysis, which stresses the relation between economic activity and the forceful appropriation of slaves, would appear to contradict the earlier arguments. But the contradiction is only superficial. For in many periods slaving was profitable. And it was when it failed to remain so that the economic interests moved into opposition to those who organized the means of plunder. As Wilks notes for Asante:

The decline in the maritime markets for slaves . . . had the effect of making warfare less profitable and therefore less popular. [1975, p. 681]

There can be little doubt that it was the sharp decline of the maritime markets for slaves at the beginning of the nineteenth century that was one of the principal reasons for the failure of the imperial or war party to maintain control over the Asante councils. . . . [1975, p. 680]

Further evidence for the link between profit maximization and slaving is the work of LeVeene and Gemery and Hogendorn; they report significant positive relationships between changes in price and changes in the supply of slaves from West Africa, thus establishing a

necessary condition for arguing that the slave trade represented profit maximizing behavior. Given that the slave trade and profit seeking were so closely combined, we can thus comprehend how economic interests could both support and oppose the military, depending upon whether the economic climate favored raiding or other economic endeavors.

#### THE STATE AS MEANS OF REDISTRIBUTION

With obvious exceptions, many of the arguments thus far presented in this paper are "neo-classical" in spirit. They stress the role of the state in securing economic prosperity. Inevitably, however, the paper has entered another realm of political explanation: one in which the power to coerce is seen not as a means of establishing a framework for common prosperity but rather as a means for redistributing income. Redistribution, as well as efficiency, is commonly a goal of political action; and this, of course, was as true in pre-colonial Africa as it has been in other periods and places. In this section we examine arguments which stress the political basis of economic redistribution. We do so in large part by focusing on stratification in African societies.

One of the classic explanations for the formation of African states emphasizes the role of domination between divergent modes of agricultural production. While more recent scholarship (some of which is summarized in Oliver 1977) calls this interpretation into question, many scholars have stressed the role of the state in enabling

"pastoralists" to rule over "agriculturalists". Such arguments feature in the ethnography of the intralacustrian areas, of course, but also in studies of the Shilluk, Rosvi, and Zulu (Mercer, Mudenge, and Gluckman 1970). In these and other societies, it has been held, pastoralist populations, with their valuable herds and their mastery of techniques of warfare, employ the state to exact tribute and services from the sedentary agriculturalists. Alluding to the argument of Oppenheimer, scholars have thus interpreted the traditional state in Africa as a mechanism of pastoralist domination.

The data only partially support this argument. They clearly indicate that domination by those who practice one form of agricultural production over those who practice another does indeed necessitate political centralization (Table 14); three of the four measures of centralization correlate with domination by one or another of these groups. Contradicting the argument, however, is that the data suggest that the pattern of domination can favor either group; the "warlike pastoralists" are not always preeminent. Even more to the point is that either pattern is very rare; cohabitation rather than domination commonly characterizes the relationship between pastoralists and agriculturalists.

Political centralization and internal stratification can relate in other ways, however. Through the power to levy tribute, to collect taxes, and to structure property rights, those in charge of the state can employ it to induce patterns of inequality. Agrarian states commonly underpin stable patterns of collective advantage in

the form of estates and castes. As seen in Table 15, this appears to have been true in pre-colonial Africa as well; with but two exceptions, the greater the degree of political centralization, the more frequent the occurrence of an aristocracy or a system of castes.

In earlier sections, we have noted the relationship between the formation of states and the growth of specialization and trade. Relevant to the present argument is another side of the relationship. Not only can the state be used to promote trade; it can also be employed to restrict it. With more highly centralized polities, not only can craft specialization develop (as seen in Table 5) but also craftsmen can better employ political power to restrict entry into their trade (i.e. form guilds), to limit output, or to set prices. Our data give limited support to this argument; the possession of monarchies and centralized bureaucracies does tend to associate with the adoption of restrictive practices (Table 16), although the relationship is neither significant nor clear cut and military indicators of centralization fail to behave in a similar manner. Materials from historical and anthropological accounts provide further evidence. They suggest not only that states help to form and maintain market places — as seen in Table 2 — but also that centralized governments are in a position to impose non-competitive prices by abetting collusion among traders. In one famous account, for example, Karl Polanyi documents (and lauds) the existence of such procedures in Dahomey; a more lurid discussion is provided by the Tardits, who describe the sanctions imposed upon Dahomean marketers by the zangbeto

society, a secret society operating with the specific authorization of the state:

Zangbeto watches the merchants and if they find that a woman trespasses the law, the members of the association walk through the village for seven nights, cursing the woman who disregarded the [customary price]. . . . If she does not comply, zangbeto will come out again, curse her for sixteen more nights and carry through the village a banana tree branch wrapped in a cloth representing a corpse in a shroud. . . . The tradition says that the lawbreaker dies shortly afterwards. [pp. 101-102]

The governance of the market places by the state thus not only facilitates trade; it also facilitates the restraint of trade and the securing of a redistribution of income.

The marketers are not the sole beneficiaries of state support for non-competitive practices, however. The rulers themselves also secure the advantages conferred by state power. Thus our data indicate that in over 80 percent of those societies which had governmental structures, as opposed to merely structures of kinship, the chiefs possessed monopoly rights of one kind or another (Table 17). Table 18 indicates the most common forms of this practice.

Despite the arguments of many that little by way of economic advantage separated the political elites of African states from their followers, the data (Table 19) strongly suggest that the rulers lived better: they were better housed, better clothed, better fed, and had

greater access to productive resources. Government and inequality go together, it would appear, in pre-colonial Africa just as they do elsewhere.

#### CONCLUSION

The literature on traditional states confronts us with a stark choice: we are invited to subscribe either to the "neo-contractarians," who see the state as a mechanism for securing collective advantage, or the "neo-Marxists," who see it as an agency of expropriation.

Exemplifying the first would be scholars such as Elman Service. As with many whose arguments have been examined here, Service stresses the benefits of political organization. He argues that these benefits alone would help to explain the adoption of centralized political systems. As we have seen, in pre-colonial Africa, the states underpinned specialization and trade; they terminated feuds; they provided peace and stability and the conditions for private investment; they formed public works; and they generated wealth, if only in the form of plunder. In these ways, the states secured prosperity for their citizens. Service and others would argue that that is why they exist.

Arguing against this position would be scholars such as Fried who see the state as essentially redistributive. The need to protect stratification, inequality, and privilege, it is held, provides the principal impetus to political organization. As we have seen, in

pre-colonial Africa, states provided means for expropriation and redistribution. They underpinned slavery. They supported an aristocracy and a system of castes. Their rulers were relatively wealthy. And the prosperity they generated was unequally shared.

In the literature at large, then, we are exhorted to join the camp that sees the state as the source of collective prosperity or the camp that sees the state as the source of oppression. But the evidence forces us to realize that in pre-colonial Africa states were both. There are two faces to the relationship between political centralization and economic gain; prosperity and equality fail to go together. The question then arises: was the level of inequality a "reasonable" price to pay for securing the benefits of the state system?

The question is difficult to answer. It does no good to argue, as did Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, that "it must not be forgotten . . . that those who derive maximum economic benefit from political office also have the maximum administrative, judicial, and religious responsibilities" (pp. 8-9); for the question is not whether benefits were exchanged for costs, but rather whether the rate of exchange was "satisfactory." Moreover, it does little good to note whether the people themselves were satisfied. For in the political realm, where private wealth is exchanged for public goods and services, it "pays" to act dissatisfied if only to secure the services at a lower price. As noted by Skinner, for example, the citizens of these states are just as likely as those elsewhere to complain about

the balance they secure in their exchanges with the state:

There is . . . always an air of mutual recrimination among the Mossi and their rulers about the level of reciprocation between them. The people admit that chiefs are indispensable; yet they complain that they are greedy -- they "eat" too much. The chiefs insist that it is difficult to rule a territory and complain that the people are ungrateful. [Skinner 1962, p. 267]

Rather than noting that public services are in fact exchanged for private resources and rather than recording the attitudes of the people, then, a less direct tactic is required. One that offers much promise is to enquire into the relative bargaining positions of the elites and the masses in the pre-colonial states.

We have noted that in Central and Southern Africa, at least, land was relatively uniform in quality; moreover, being abundant, it was practically free. In societies where people derived their incomes from farming, this meant that they could readily move from one society to another. As Colson notes, the result was that

Given provocation, subjects could migrate beyond the borders as well as within the boundaries of a kingdom. Malcontents [could] join . . . some [other] polity. . . . [1969, p. 44]

Being mobile, the citizenry could thus bargain for favorable treatment by their rulers. Not only did they possess the means to exit, however; the evidence suggests that they also possessed

institutionalized means of giving voice and thereby securing more favorable policies from their governments. Commoners often controlled particular offices, such as the "prime ministership," the principal administrative office in the nation. Chiefs often had rule through councils dominated by nonroyals. The Oyo Mesi is an extreme example; it repeatedly deposed the Alafin and often compelled his "suicide" (Morton-Williams, Law, Atanda). In many cases, commoners kept the selection and appointment of administrative personnel out of the hands of the king; the rule of hereditary succession to headmanships or territorial chieftainships insured that lineage elders could control the selection of administrative personnel (see the discussion in Southwold). The fact that in most states the people were the army and that the monarchs had no independent full-time forces of his own also placed limits on central power. And the commoners sometimes exerted considerable influence upon public officials through the agency of secret societies.<sup>12</sup>

The extent to which commoner institutions prevailed even in centralized societies is suggested in the data. Commoner councils to debate policy existed in 36 percent of the central monarchies and chieftaincies; and commoner councils to try cases existed in over 75 percent of the chieftaincies and in virtually all of the central monarchies. Moreover, as shown in Table 20, the existence of privileged strata, such as aristocracies or castes, failed to diminish the likelihood of the existence of such councils. Indeed, the data suggest the opposite; rather than being antagonistic tendencies,

stratification and the institutionalization of commoner councils appear either to have been independent phenomena or to have systematically gone together!

The citizenry thus possessed both the option to exit and the capacity to give voice to their interests. Further enhancing their bargaining power was the level of competition for office within the political elite.

Long ago anthropologists studying African political systems discredited the notion that rules of descent placed unambiguous constraints upon the selection of rulers. Instead, as Gluckman writes, "rarely in Africa do we find rules which indicate clearly and definitely a single heir. . . . Or if the rules themselves were clear, they operated uncertainly in practice. The result was that almost ever succession could raise rival claimants . . ." (1959, p. 46).<sup>13</sup> Contestants for office had to gather a following; and in competing for supporters, they used their elite positions to generate benefits for the citizenry and made pledges of further benefits in the event that they should acquire power. Competition took place during succession disputes, which were contested by branches of the royal clan, by the sons and the nephews of former kings, or by prominent regional chiefs. It also took place between the members of the ruling elite -- the cattle, and army and administrative chiefs in Burundi, for example;<sup>14</sup> between regional elites, such as Chitimukulu and Mwamba, his regional rival, among the Bemba; or between segments of the royal lineage, as among the Kanuri. As Ronald Cohen writes:



The major internal opposition to the monarch lay within the other segments of the royal lineage, that is to say, among his competitors for the royal office. These men and their followers, using whatever support they could obtain among the titled nobility, presented a constant danger of usurpation and even assassination to the ruling monarch. Excessive tyranny, continued lack of military success, local uprisings, or even weakened physical condition through ill-health or old age, stimulated such opposition. [1970, p. 192]

The citizenry could thus exit. Through institutionalized means of access to power, they could oppose. Given the presence of vigorous competition for public office, they could bargain and exact. While there was inequality in the states of pre-colonial Africa, the evidence thus makes it extremely difficult to argue that the states could be employed by a privileged few to systematically oppress the masses or to exact resources from them. The states may well have, as we have seen, supported institutionalized patterns of inequality and underpinned systematic patterns of privilege. But the evidence suggests that those who held positions of privilege had to insure that the benefits created by the states were widely shared. For the bargaining power of the masses, relative to the elites, was strong. And to retain power the elites had per force to serve the interests of their followers, if only because failing that, they would lose their followers, physically or politically, or other elites would displace them.

## FOOTNOTES

\* The following people, at one time or another, have commented upon this essay. While I have taken many of their criticisms into account, I am nonetheless conscious that despite these efforts many deficiencies remain. For these I am solely responsible. Lance Davis, Phillip Hoffman, Gary Cox, Elizabeth Colson, Ronald Cohen, Douglass North, George Dalton, William O. Jones, David Laitin, John Ferejohn, Eleanor Searle, and Kenneth McCue. I particularly appreciate Kenneth McCue's work on the data analysis and his attempts to elevate it beyond elementary tabular analysis. The expenses of this work were paid in part by Grant No. SOC 77-08573 from the National Science Foundation.

1. The sample set of societies and the magnitude of the documentation which my researcher covered for each is indicated in Table 21:
2. See Pirenne and Wallerstein. See also Sabloff and Lamberg-Karlovsky. Note also the following quote: "What was 'peace' for the author of Beowulf but the prospect of exchanging gifts between peoples!" From George Duby, The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1974), quoted in Dalton, 1978, p. 131.
3. For the Sukuma, see Liebenow 1960, p. 234. For the Anuak, see

Gluckman 1965, pp. 125-126. For the Tio, see Vansina, 1973, p. 319. For the societies of Southeastern Nigeria, see Northrup and Ruel. For the kingdoms of Ruanda and Burundi, note Maquet, who states: "The Watutsi used several strategies but rarely, it seems, direct military conquest. The ascendancy which the invaders gained from their war-like reputation and the prestige of their wealth enabled them to arbitrate disputes between peasants" (Maquet, 1971, p. 143).

4. I did not do the coding myself, and purposely so. Rather, I first wrote a long paper in which I summarized the arguments concerning the economic basis for state formation in pre-colonial Africa. I developed a code book to collect information from the Human Relations Area Files which would allow me to test these arguments. I then had the data collected "blind," i.e. by coders who had not read my paper or discussed the ideas in it with me. My research assistants knew I was looking for relationships between economic and political factors in African tribal societies, but they had no knowledge of the exact arguments I was trying to test nor of the particular relationships that would have served as tests of them. By keeping them "blind" I thereby attempted to shield against bias in my research procedures.
5. It should be noted that I reassessed these relationships while controlling for the factor of ecological variation. While the small number of cases made difficult the use of such procedures,

the results suggest that "economic" factors -- the possession of markets, caravans and long-distance trade -- continue to affect the level of political centralization, even when ecological factors are controlled.

6. For general analyses of the public goods problem, see Olson; also Riker and Odershook. Application of economic analysis to the problem of institutional change, see Davis and North and North and Thomas. For an interesting application to African materials, see Posner. For a telling critique of institutional arguments which fail to take account of the problem of public goods, see Popkin.
7. One form of investment which correlated strongly with political centralization was investment in irrigation and water storage. The number of cases was far too small to yield a significant relationship. Nonetheless, the parallel with Wittfogel's analysis of non-African cases is intriguing.
8. Indicative of the importance of the costs of security is the magnitude of the change in the behavior of the long-distance traders when they were provided with protection by central states. Hopkins notes that in the nineteenth century, Hausa caravans of 1,000 to 2,000 people were common. But he argues,
 

There were diseconomies of scale which became apparent during the colonial period. With greater freedom of

movement and more secure markets, long distance traders began to travel in small groups, an arrangement which gave them flexibility in timing departures and arrivals, offered them a wider choice of routes, and reduced their overheads, since it was no longer necessary to contribute towards the cost of guards and guides. [p. 63]

By transferring the provision of security outside of their firms, the organizers of caravans were then able to operate at a lower scale and thus, given the nature of their enterprise, to conduct their business more efficiently and so earn higher profits. These gains in efficiency represented benefits from the existence of states, and so constituted material incentives for their formation. For an excellent review of the literature on long distance trade, see Jones (1980): pp. 12-19. It should be noted that Jones, in a personal communication, vigorously dissents from this portion of my analysis.

9. It should also be noted that the source of the relationship between craft specialization in political centralization does not result from the government's purchase of crafts. Thus the data in Table 22.
10. I also tested the relationship using analysis of variance. The relationships were not significant. However, as noted earlier, analysis of variance assumes a normal sampling distribution, which we lack here; not much significance should therefore be

attributed to this result.

11. As Wilks states: "The imposition of tolls and market dues was . . . a widespread means of raising revenues and being . . . relatively simple and virtually riskless, it may well have been preferred . . . to direct trading" (1975, p. 62).
12. For a general discussion of the limits to power, see Beattie 1959.
13. In Benin, primogeniture determined succession to office. Nonetheless, competition prevailed; conflict simply centered on who was first born. See Crowder and Ikime, p. xi.

In a passage typical of much recent work on oral traditions, Vansina discredits the myth of dynastic harmony and continuity among the Bushong; his comments are highly relevant here:

A reexamination of the data leads to the startling conclusion that many successions were in fact disputed, thus giving substance to the Bushong feeling that parties to most struggles were made up of the king and his followers on the one hand and his heir apparent and his followers on the other. In almost every generation a struggle took place. [1978, p. 156]

14. The case of Rwanda and Burundi forms a constant counterpoint to this argument, simply because the relationship between the Watutsi and the Bahutu appears to have been among the most

exploitative in the traditional societies of Africa.

Nonetheless, within that society, competition within the Watutsi ruling class clearly existed; it appeared to curtail the degree to which the rulers were able to exact resources from their followers; and it led to positive benefits for followers. Thus, Gravel documents the "play for power" within the ruling stratum and the promotion of even Hutu lineages into the ruling "caste" that resulted (Gravel; see also Lemarchand, 1966). The institution of clientship, and the competitive search among the ruling elite for clients, also placed limits on the degree to which the rulers could demand resources and services from their followers; as Maquet states: "When a lord appeared to be too demanding of his clients, he no longer found new ones, and those he had would try to leave him" (1967, p. 85).

Nonetheless, there can be little doubt but that the position of the Hutu followers was far more unfavorable than that of their counterparts in other African societies. I would attribute this to relatively high ratio of men to land in this kingdom -- something that allowed the rulers to set a relatively high price on access to land.

I would also argue that most commentators overestimate the degree of exploitation that existed in the pre-colonial era, an error that arises from extrapolating present information into the past. In the post-colonial era, the growth of population promoted and enabled even greater exactions by the rulers as the

price of Hutu access to land. In addition, the colonial rulers curtailed the level of competition within the Watutsi elite, this enabling the elite to cohere in opposition to the Hutu to a degree that hitherto had been impossible. Evidence of this is the argument of Lemarchand, who states:

The impact of indirect rule has been, first of all, to destroy the old balance of forces between cattle chiefs, land chiefs and army chiefs, which in previous times had served to protect the Hutu peasantry against undue exactions. . . . Not only did [the concentration of power] deprive the Hutu of opportunities to play one chief off against another, but it also eliminated the channels of appeal offered by the previous arrangement. [1970, pp. 119-120]

Lemarchand goes on to document the extent to which the rulers' levies increased under colonial rule and concludes by noting that the exploitative aspect of the relationship between the Watutsi and the Bahutu was "unquestionably worse" under colonial rule (p. 123).

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Table 1: Political Structure and Ecological Variation  
(Percent)

Ecologically Diversified Area:

Political Structure		Central Bureaucracy		National Army		Army Commanded At	
Kinship	17	Absent	40	Absent	40	Local Level	40
Chiefs	50	Present	60	Present	60	Regional Level	20
Centralized Monarch	33					National Level	40
N=	6		5		5		5

Society Abuts on an Ecological Divide:

Political Structure		Central Bureaucracy		National Army		Army Commanded At	
Kinship	12	Absent	25	Absent	38	Local Level	62
Chiefs	38	Present	75	Present	62	Regional Level	0
Centralized Monarch	50					National Level	38
N=	8		8		8		8

No Significant Ecological Variation:

Political Structure*		Central Bureaucracy*		National Army		Army Commanded At	
Kinship	40	Absent	67	Absent	50	Local Level	50
Chiefs	20	Present	33	Present	50	Regional Level	10
Centralized Monarch	40					National Level	40
N=	20		18		20		20

\* Chi squared significant at .10 level

Table 2: Relation With Measure of Trade  
Societies Possess Market Centers?  
(Percent)

Political Structure*	Central Bureaucracy*		National Army		Army Commanded At	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Kinship	15	32	Absent	42 87	Absent	54 50
Chiefs	31	42	Present	58 13	Present	46 50
Central					Local Level	15 6
Monarchs	54	26			Regional Level	54 50
N =	13	19		12 16	National Level	31 44
						13 16

Societies Possess Trade Caravans?  
(Percent)

Political Structure**	Central Bureaucracy*		National Army		Army Commanded At	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Kinship	0	43	Absent	44 79	Absent	45 56
Chiefs	45	24	Present	56 21	Present	55 44
Central					Local Level	18 0
Monarchs	55	33			Regional Level	46 56
N =	11	21		9 19		36 44
						11 18

Was Trade Mainly Local (L) or Long Distance (LD)?  
(Percent)

Political Structure***	Central Bureaucracy*		National Army		Army Commanded At	
	L	LD	L	LD	L	LD
Kinship	53	6	Absent	60 31	Absent	47 47
Chiefs	0	50	Present	40 69	Present	53 53
Central					Local Level	6 13
Monarchs	47	44			Regional Level	47 47
N=	15	16		15 13	National Level	47 40
						15 15

\* Chi squared significant at .10 level

\*\* Chi squared significant at .05 level

\*\*\*Chi squared significant at .01 level

Table 3: Political Centralization and Feuds

Are There Feuds? (Percent `Yes`)											
Political Structure***			Central Bureaucracy***			National Army			Army Commanded At		
N			N			N			N		
Kinship	89	9	Absent	72	9	Absent	69	16	Local Level	100	2
Chiefs	78	9	Present	27	18	Present	43	14	Regional Level	69	16
Centralized Monarchs	23	13							National Level	42	12

\*\*\* Chi squared significant at .01 level

Table 4: Political Structure and Private Investment

		Are There Instances Where Large Captial Investments Are Made by Private Groups? (Percent)											
Political Structure		Central Bureaucracy				National Army				Army Commanded At			
		Yes		No		Yes		No		Yes		No	
Kinship	0	36	Absent	50	52	Absent	50	52		Local Level	50	44	
Chiefs	33	32	Present	50	48	Present	50	48		Regional Level	17	4	
Central Monarchs	67	32								National Level	33	52	
N =	6	28				6	28			6	25		

Table 5: Political Centralization, Craft  
Specialization and the Holding of Inventories

Carrying of Large Inventories? (Percent)											
Political Structure**			Central Bureaucracy**			National Army			Army Commanded At		
	Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No
Kinship	8	45	Absent	45	84	Absent	38	61	Local Level	15	6
Chiefs	31	30	Present	55	16	Present	62	39	Regional Level	39	61
Central Monarchs	62	25							National Level	46	33
N =	13	20		11	21		13	18		13	18

Craft Specialists? (Percent)											
Political Structure***			Central Bureaucracy**			National Army			Army Commanded At		
	Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No
Kinship	21	45	Absent	43	100	Absent	46	75	Local Level	12	0
Chiefs	25	55	Present	57	0	Present	54	25	Regional Level	46	75
Central Monarchs	54	0							National Level	42	25
N =	24	11		21	10		24	8		24	8

\*\* Chi squared significant at .05 level

\*\*\* Chi squared significant at .01 level

Table 6: Soil Fertility and Political Structure

Is the Quality of Soils High by Comparison  
With The Soils in Surrounding Areas?  
(Percent)

Political Structure	Central Bureaucracy		National Army*		Army Commanded At*	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Kinship	17	50	Absent	62 83	Absent	35 83
Chiefs	33	17	Present	38 17	Present	65 17
Central Monarchs	50	33				
					Local Level	12 0
					Regional Level	35 83
					National Level	53 17
N =	18	6		16 6		17 6

\* Chi squared significant at .10 level

Table 7: Population Density And Political Centralization

Using Upper Estimates of Population Density:  
Population Density

Political Structure	Central Bureaucracy+		National Army+++		Army Commanded At+++	
Lo(1) Hi(2)	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Kinship 33% 25%	Absent	56% 71%	Absent	75% 29%	Local Level	75% 29%
Chiefs 22 25	Present	44 29	Present	25 71	Regional Level	0 0
Central Monarchs 44 50					National Level	25 71
N = 9 8		9 7		8 7		8 7

Using Lower Estimates of Population Density:  
Population Density

Political Structure	Central Bureaucracy		National Army+		Army Commanded At*	
Lo(3) Hi(4)	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi
Kinship 60% 17%	Absent	80% 20%	Absent	100% 0%	Local Level	100% 0%
Chiefs 20 17	Present	20 80	Present	0 100	Regional Level	0 0
Central Monarchs 20 66					National Level	0 100
N = 5 6		5 5		5 5		5 5

Upper estimates of population density:

- (1) Lo: 40 persons or less per sq. mile  
 (2) Hi: Over 40 persons per sq. mile

+ p &lt; .10, Fisher exact test

+++p &lt; .01, Fisher exact test

Lower estimates of population density:

- (3) Lo: 10 persons or less per sq. mile  
 (4) Hi: Over 10 persons per sq. mile

Table 8: Measures of Centralization and Trade.  
Controlling for Population Density  
(Percent)

Population Density Low (1)					
	Caravan	Traffic?		Market Centers?	
	Yes	No		Yes	No
Political Structure			Central Bureaucracy		
Kinship	0	50	Absent	25	100
Chiefs	50	17	Present	75	0
Central Monarchs	50	33			
N=	2	6		4	4

Population Density High (2)					
		Caravan	Traffic?	Market Centers?	
		Yes	No	Yes	No
Political Structure			Central Bureaucracy		
Kinship	0	40	Absent	50	100
Chiefs	0	20	Present	50	0
Central Monarchs	100	40			
N=	2	5		4	2

(1) Low: 40 persons or less per square mile

(2) High: Over 40 persons per square mile

Table 9: Mining and Centralization  
Does This Society's Territories Include

Political Structure**		Gold Mines? (Percent)		National Army		Army Commanded At	
		Central Bureaucracy**					
	Yes No		Yes No		Yes No		Yes No
Kinship	0 35	Absent	25 76	Absent	25 56	Local Level	25 8
Chiefs	0 31	Present	75 24	Present	75 44	Regional Level	25 56
Central	100 31					National Level	50 36
Monarchs							
N =	4 26		4 25		4 25		4 25

Political Structure*		Copper Mines? (Percent)		National Army		Army Commanded At	
		Central Bureaucracy**					
	Yes No		Yes No		Yes No		Yes No
Kinship	0 37	Absent	0 77	Absent	50 54	Local Level	0 8
Chiefs	0 30	Present	100 23	Present	50 46	Regional Level	50 54
Central	100 33					National Level	50 38
Monarchs							
N =	2 27		2 26		2 26		2 26

Political Structure		Salt Mines? (Percent)		National Army		Army Commanded At	
		Central Bureaucracy*					
	Yes No		Yes No		Yes No		Yes No
Kinship	0 37	Absent	0 74	Absent	0 50	Local Level	0 8
Chiefs	50 26	Present	100 26	Present	100 50	Regional Level	100 50
Central	50 37					National Level	0 42
Monarchs							
N =	2 27		2 27		2 26		2 26

Political Structure*		Iron Mines? (Percent)		National Army		Army Commanded At*	
		Central Bureaucracy*					
	Y N		Y N		Y N		Y N
Kinship	25 37	Absent	50 82	Absent	42 56	Local Level	25 0
Chiefs	8 37	Present	50 18	Present	58 44	Regional Level	42 56
Central	67 26					National Level	33 44
Monarchs							
N =	12 19		12 17		12 18		12 18

\* Chi squared significant at .10 level

\*\*Chi squared significant at .05 level



Table 10: State Formation and Public Goods  
Were There Roads?  
(Percent `Yes`)

Political Structure**		Central Bureaucracy++	National Army	Army Commanded At	
Kinship	0	Absent 14	Absent 27	Local Level	27
Chiefs	20	Present 88	Present 50	Regional Level	50
Centralized	75			National Level	50
Monarch					
N=	30	29	29		29

Were There Bridges?  
(Percent `Yes`)

Political Structure*		Central Bureaucracy+++	National Army*	Army Commanded At*	
Kinship	0	Absent 0	Absent 0	Local Level	0
Chiefs	0	Present 40	Present 17	Regional Level	0
Centralized	22			National Level	20
Monarch					
N=	27	26	26		26

Were There Pontoons?  
(Percent `Yes`)

Political Structure*		Central Bureaucracy	National Army*	Army Commanded At*	
Kinship	0	Absent 10	Absent 7	Local Level	7
Chiefs	0	Present 50	Present 27	Regional Level	0
Centralized	50			National Level	33
Monarch					
N=	26	25	25		25

Were There Canals?  
(Percent `Yes`)

Political Structure*		Central Bureaucracy*	National Army*	Army Commanded At*	
Kinship	0	Absent 5	Absent 13	Local Level	13
Chiefs	11	Present 40	Present 17	Regional Level	0
Centralized	33			National Level	20
Monarch					
N=	28	26	27		31

\* Chi squared significant at .10 level

\*\* Chi squared significant at .05 level

++ p < .05, Fisher exact test

+++ p < .01, Fisher exact test

Table 11: Slave Trade and Political Structure

Trade in Slaves? (Percent)										
Political Structure**			Central Bureaucracy***			National Army***			Army Commanded At	
	Yes	No	Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No
Kinship	0	40	Absent	25	83	Absent	11	65	Local Level	11 30
Chiefs	22	32	Present	75	17	Present	89	35	Regional Level	22 4
Central Monarchs	78	28							National Level	67 65
N=	9	25		8	23		9	23		9 23

Import Guns? (Percent)										
Political Structure			Central Bureaucracy**			National Army			Army Commanded At	
	Yes	No	Yes	No		Yes	No		Yes	No
Kinship	10	38	Absent	29	79	Absent	50	50	Local Level	40 41
Chiefs	40	25	Present	71	21	Present	50	50	Regional Level	10 9
Central Monarchs	50	38							National Level	50 50
N=	10	24		7	24		10	22		10 22

\*\* Chi squared significant at .05 level

\*\*\* Chi squared significant at .01 level

Table 12: The Slave Economy

	Trade in Slaves? (Percent)		Import guns? (Percent)	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Are there:				
Market Centers?				
Yes	50	41	56	38
No	50	59	44	62
N=	8	22	9	21
Craft Specialists?				
Yes	100	60	90	63
No	0	40	10	37
N=	9	25	10	24
	**		*	
Caravans?				
Yes	88	17	56	27
No	12	83	44	73
N=	8	23	9	22
	***			
Was Trade Mainly Local?				
Yes	25	59	30	57
No	75	41	70	43
N=	8	22	10	21
	*			
Was there carrying of inventories?				
Yes	89	21	70	26
No	11	79	30	74
N=	9	24	10	23
	***		**	

\*Chi squared significant at .10 level

\*\*Chi squared significant at .05 level

\*\*\*Chi squared significant at .01 level

Table 13: Slave Trade and Feuds

Are there feuds?	Trade in Slaves? (Percent)		Import guns? (Percent)	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	38	62	62	52
No	62	38	38	48
N=	8	21	8	21

Table 14: Social Domination and Political Centralization

Political structure based on:	Pastoralists dominate (Percent)	Agriculturalists dominate (Percent)	No domination (Percent)
Kinship	0	0	24
Chieftancies	0	0	38
Central Monarchs	100	100	38
N=	1	1	29
Central Bureaucracy			
Present	100	0	35
Absent	0	100	65
N=	1	1	26
National Army			
Yes	100	100	44
No	0	0	56
N=	1	1	27
Army Organized at			
National level	100	100	33
Regional level	0	0	56
Local level	0	0	11
N=	1	1	27

Table 15: Stratification and Centralization  
Are There Castes?  
(Percent `Yes`)

Political Structure		Central Bureaucracy**		National Army		Army Commanded At	
Kinship	10	Absent	27	Absent	35	Local Level	50
Chiefs	30	Present	50	Present	29	Regional Level	35
Central Monarchs	43					National Level	25
N=	31		30		31		31

Is there a Class of Nobles or an Aristocracy?  
(Percent `Yes`)

Political Structure***		Central Bureaucracy**		National Army		Army Commanded At	
Kinship	0	Absent	37	Absent	46	Local Level	50
Chiefs	57	Present	87	Present	69	Regional Level	46
Central Monarchs	92					National Level	73
N=	28		27		26		26

\*\* Chi squared significant at .05 level

\*\*\* Chi squared significant at .01 level

Table 16: Do Craft Specialists Have the Right to Set Prices.  
 Restrict Entry or Limit Output?  
 (Percent 'Yes')

Political Structure		Central Bureaucracy		National Army		Army Commanded At	
Kinship	33	Absent	33	Absent	67	Local Level	67
Chiefs	0	Present	67	Present	33	Regional Level	57
Central Monarchs	50					National Level	17
N=	16		15		18		16

Table 17: Chiefs and Economic Redistribution

Do chiefs have monopoly rights?  
(Percent `Yes`)

Yes	57
No	11
Not Applicable	31
N=	35

Table 18: Most Frequently Mentioned Objects of Chiefs' Monopoly

Object	No. of mentions
Ivory	6
Kola	2
Slaves	6
Cattle	2
Skins	2
Parts of game killed	10



Table 19: Chiefs and Inequality  
(Percent)

Do Kings or Chiefs have:

More luxurious homes?

Yes	66
No	6
Not applicable	29
N=	35

More livestock?

Yes	58
No	6
Not applicable	36
N=	33

More Slaves/retainers?

Yes	59
No	6
Not applicable	34
N=	32

Greater lands?

Yes	62
No	9
Not applicable	29
N=	34

Better diets/more food?

Yes	61
No	6
Not applicable	32
N=	31

More luxurious clothes?

Yes	59
No	9
Not applicable	31
N=	32

Table 20: Commoner Institutions and Stratification

	Were there aristocrats?		Were there castes?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Was there a commoner council to:				
Debate policy?				
Yes	40	15	40	22
No	60	15	50	39
Not applicable	0	69	10	39
N=	15	13	10	23
Try Cases?				
Yes	93	31	78	63
No	7	69	20	38
Not applicable	0	0	0	0
N	15	13	9	24
	***			

\*\*\*Chi squared significant at .01 level

Table 21: Societies and Documentation

Name of Society	Number of Pages of Documentation	Name of Society	Number of Pages of Documentation
Bambara	1,127	Chagga	1,986
Dogon	1,132	Ngondo	1,474
Mossi	942	Pygmies	1,350
Mande	605	Azande	3,264
Tallensi	964	Mongo	773
Ashanti	3,523	Rundi	1,314
Katab	352	Mbundu	847
Nupe	856	Bemba	830
Tiv	2,891	Ila	998
Yoruba	1,637	Lozi	1,635
Fang	1,117	Tonga	1,616
Nuer	1,541	Ngoni	1,123
Shilluk	1,073	Thonga	1,231
Ganda	2,261	Yao	555
Dorobo	354	Bushmen	1,259
Kikuyu	1,950	Hottentot	1,339
Luo	463	Lovedu	455
Masai	2,085	Tanala	354

Table 22: Government and Crafts

	Is Government the major consumer of crafts?	
	No.	%
Yes	4	11
No	15	42
Not applicable	15	42
No information	2	5
Total	36	100